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Introduction
For more than a decade the governments of Sub-Saharan Africa have been under
strong pressure from the donor community to liberalise their economic systems.
Since 1989 the same governments have also been pressurised by external and
intern al forces alike to replace their authorItarian rules by multiparty democracy.
The collapse of the Central and Eastern European communist regimes, widespread
corruption and agenerally dismal economic record of these authoritarian regimes,
have since the beginning of this decade provided African opposition forces with
formidable moral support for their crusade against various one-party regimes. The
intern al pressures for change are now backed by the major international donor
agencies as politicalliberalisation has increasingly become an additional condition
for economic aid. Thus, the two main development trends in the last decade appear
to be the emergence of a twin process of political and economic liberalisation.
The main challenge for emerging transitional governments attempting to
implement economic and political reforms simultaneously is to achieve a balance
between participation and meeting popular demands on the one hand, and at the
same time implementing the market-based reforms. One of the main differences
between the authoritarian paradigm and the new liberal perspective, relates to the
role of interest groups in economic policy-making. When the structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) were introduced in the early 1980s, authoritarian
regimes were considered most conducive to their implementation (World Bank
1981). While perhaps not overtly advocating for authoritarian practices, the main
theoretical contributions of the 1970s and 1980s gave credence to such a view by
the donor agencies in arguing that interest group intervention would hamper
economic reform. A leading argument held that in order to achieve economic
growth, economic decision-makng should be insulated from popular demand
(Nelson 1990, Haggard and Kaufman 1989). However, after close to a decade of
rather poor economic results and increasing internal opposition against corruption
and the bad economic performance of authoritarian regimes, the new focus on
political and economic liberalisation assigns a vital role to civil society
associations (World Bank 1989 and 1992; Landell-Mils 1992). According to the
research deparment of the World Bank, it is necessary to achieve a sense of
"ownership" of the reform programme by both the government and societal groups
in the reforming countries if the economic reform programme is to succeed (World
Bank 1989 and 1992; Healey and Robinson 1992). Focusing on political
liberalisation, donors and an increasing number of scholars have, therefore, since
the late 1980s stressed the need to create constituencies of support for the
economic reforms. The politicallogic behind this reasoning seems to be that once
the economic reforms are implemented, the sectors of society benefitting from the
reform measures wil provide the new liberal governments with political support
(Nelson 1993).
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The question remains, however, whether the new panacea of economic and
politicalliberalisation is a feasible option for Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the main
questions concerning the new political and economic developments in Sub-Saharan
Africa is to what extent interest groups actually matter in economic policy-making.
Did interest groups shape the former policies of the one-party regimes and are
organised interests likely to respond to market-based economic reforms? The
economic reform proposals for Sub-Sahara Africa over the past decade have aimed
at redressing the imbalance between the urban and rural sectors of the economy
by strengthening agricultural production. Following the politicallogic of the donor
community, African governments should then seek to build rural constituencies of
support. This paper wil discuss the feasibilty of such an option based on a review
of state - interest group relations in post-colonial Africa. The general discussion
wil be ilustrated with references to my own fieldwork in Zambia.
With regard to the questions raised above Zambia represents a very interesting
case-study. Under the one-party authoritarian rule of Kenneth Kaunda and the
United National Independence Party (UNIP) Zambia failed to implement the
economic reforms advocated by the World Bank and International Monetar Fund
(IMF). The failure to alter the economic policies has by a number of scholars been
attributed to the strong position of urban interest associations with vested interests
in the existing economic system (Y oung & Loxley 1990, Gibbon 1992, Callaghy
1990). However, continued economic decline became the main mobilising issue
of the growing opposition to the one-party regime. Defying theoretical axioms and
past empirical findings, a democratically-elected, urban coalition comprising of
labour and business interests has since the 1991 election been grappling with
implementing a rigorous economic reform programme in accordance with IMF and
World Bank recommendations. Zambia is, therefore, by both scholars and
development bureaucrats regarded as an important test case for the new donor
perspective of dualliberalisation. A closer scrutiny of the Zambian case may thus
guide our understanding of the broader issue of whether interest groups matter for
economic policy making in Sub-Sahara Africa. The findings and conclusions
should be considered provisional, however.
The compatibility of political and economic liberalisation
The recent postulate within donor circles that democracy is conducive to economic
development is not new to development economics. The compatibility of economic
and political liberalisation was a popular perspective among the early
modernisation theorists in the 1950s and 1960s. Seymour Martin Lipset, among
others, argued that political and economic development complemented each other
in a universal process of modernisation (Lipset 1959). However, the ideas of the
early modernisation theorists were discredited following the disappointing political
and economic performance of newly independent countries. The high growth rates
of the East Asian newly industrialising countries achieved under authoritarian
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regimes further refuted the postulates of the modernisation theory. These
experiences again enforced the view that pragmatic authoritarian rule rather than
democracy was necessary to bring about economic transformation (Sørensen
1991) .
Contrary to analyses of the development potential of some authoritarian states in
Asia and (until the 1980s) in Latin America, most studies of Sub-Saharan African
countries have concluded that authoritarianism has had adverse consequences for
economic development (Ake 1991, Bates 1981, Sandbrook 1985). Not only do
these analyses conclude that in Africa the 'trade-off argument' is not substantiated
and that authoritarianism, as a rule, has become associated with economic
stagnation and decline. It is also argued that theories of a democracy-development
trade-off have had an unintended effect because the argument that repression
promotes economic growth and development was used by political leaders to
legitimise their own free spending of state resources (Howard 1983). In the
scholarly literature African authoritarian regimes marked by patronage, rent-
seeking and corruption, increasingly became regarded to have fostered economic
stagnation and decline, and they were therefore considered not conducive to
market-based economic reforms (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Callaghy 1990). As
a result, in Sub-Saharan Africa the weak commitment to the implementation of
economic reform was increasingly attributed to the particular problems of
governance in authoritarian regimes. Reflecting the perspectives of the first
independence period, both donors and scholars again seem to place their faith on
the ability of liberal political regimes in terms of fostering economic development.
With reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, a number of scholars argue that the
structural adjustment reforms and thus economic liberalisation, promises an
"enabling environment" for democracy based on economic competitiveness and
decentralisation (Diamond et aL. 1990). Presumably, this view is based on the
premise that economic restructuring wil drastically challenge old patterns of
resource allocation and erode the clientelistic basis of African state systems.
Within the same mode of thinking, it has been argued that marked-based economic
reforms wil foster decentralisation and privatisation and thus promote a wide
dispersal of political resources (Herbst 1993). Other scholars appear sceptical to
both the prospects of implementing economic reform under democratic forms of
rule and to the sustainabilty of democracy in harsh economic conditions. Focusing
on the particular problems of Africa' s recent transitions, Lemarchand argues that
Africa's neo-patrimonial states, characterised by personal rule, by nature impede
the formation of any association not based on personal patronage or ethnic and
kinship affiiation (Lemarchand 1992). Callaghy, among others, holds that
transition to democracy may seriously threaten the insulation of the regime from
societal demands, and that elections are a serious treat to the implementation of
the structural adjustment reforms (Callaghy 1990: 204). Still others believe that the
social costs associated with the implementation of the structural adjustment
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reforms wil result in political liabilities and political instability (Bangura et aL.
1992).
Regardless of the possible advantages of sequencing economic and political
reforms, it is evident that this option is not available to most countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Due to the economic crises and the weak legitimacy of the former
regimes, the double agenda of economic and political liberalisation is at present
the most feasible option for some countries. A number of scholars as well as large
segments of the donor community regard interest groups as the key factor to the
success of the twin project of political and economic liberalisation. Interest groups,
it is argued, serve as a filter of the demands of the population towards the
leadership. Interest groups can also provide a vital source of information to the
governing authorities. And most importantly, regarding the sustainability of the
economic reform measures, interest groups participation in the economic
bargaining process may provide the country with a sense of ownership of the
reform measures (Landell-Mils 1992; World Bank 1992; Nelson 1993). Yet, the
question remains: To what extent does Sub-Saharan Africa harbour the kind of
interest groups envisaged to create constituencies of support for the proposed
economic reforms as well as a sense of ownership of the reform programmes?
Interest groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. The theory of urban bi as
The political developments in post-colonial Africa pose a number of challenges
to the application of the concept of interest group and the role of interest groups
in processes of political and economic reform. When defining an interest group in
the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, a distinction is usually drawn between modern
interest groups organised around economic issues and traditional communal
organisations based on kinship, region and ethnicity (Healey and Robinson 1992).
Economic interest groups, such as trade unions, farmers' associations, consumer
groups and business associations are essentially related to a concept of
modernisation, associated with processes of industrialisation and modernisation.
As a result, of the African associational flora only some of them can be described
as interest groups in the sense that they command a national membership and
direct their demands toward the national political centre. Modern interest groups
developed in the mid-colonial period in Africa partlyas a response to the process
of urbanisation and industrialisation. However, after independence many of these
interest groups, some having been actively involved in the struggle against
colonialism, were absorbed into state or party structures (Bates 1981). As the
independent governments sought to control civil society by subjugating the
associations to the state, a number of previously voluntary associations have
existed within the boundaries of the state. Thus, a sec ond concern when focusing
on the role of interest groups in Sub-Saharan African politics, relates to the
question of autonomy as it is often difficult to distinguish interest associations
from the state. Due to both the low level of economic development and the
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Tauthoritarian tendencies in the post-independence period, a number of observers
of African political developments have argued that the continent generally has
relatively few effective associations capable of imposing professional standards on
its members and advancing their interests (Healey and Robinson 1992). As many
vital interests associations, such as chambers of commerce are the creation of the
state and not dynamic independent bodies, these associations are only to a limited
degree capable of challenging the authority of the state (Landell Mils 1992).
Evidently, there are major differences within Sub-Saharan Africa with respect to
organisational density . Some countries exhibit a wide array of interest associations,
both in urban and rural areas. However, authoritarian practises, which became
widespread throughout most of the continent, became very consequential for
associationallife as well as for economic development in most African countries.
Contrary to the expectations of optimistic observers, liberal democracy proved to
be short-lived in most of Sub-Saharan Africa after independence. Within a few
years of achieving independence, the trend shifted in favour of authoritarianism
with the aim of eliminating political competition. The shift towards
authoritarianism from the mid-1960s was bein g justified on grounds that astrong
central state was necessary to further the objectives of nation-building and
economic modernisation. However, as Callaghy observes, single party regimes
proved to be instruments not of mobilsation but rather of control and
incorporation (Callaghy 1986: 32). As aresult, contemporary African states have
since the beginning of the 1980s been regarded as unresponsive to the pressure of
interest groups, unrepresentative of the wider society and ineffective in the
formulation and implementation of policy (Healey and Robinson 1992: 42).
However, rather than effectively eliminating the influence of interest associations,
it can be argued that in the patrimonial practises of the one-party systems an
economically disruptive pattern of state interest group relations developed which
clearly favoured some interests at the expense of other. According to Sandbrook,
one of the main characteristics of the authoritarian tendencies of African
governments has been that most economic interest groups have attempted less to
shape broad policies than to seek exceptions, modifications or delays in the
application of policies to their specific firms (Sandbrook 1985).
The perspectives above can be related to a more general theoretical assumption
regarding state and interest group relations in Sub-Saharan Africa, namely the
theory of urban bias. With regard to Sub-Saharan Africa, the urban bias
perspective was first put forward by Robert Bates in the early 1980s (Bates 1981).
Bates argued that in Africa, authoritarianism had created a particularly negative
form of interest group activity, in which urban interests were protected by the state
due to political considerations, whereas rural producer interest were marginalised
(Bates 1981). Reflecting on the logic of collective action, he found that as
agricultural producers constitute a large number of people, spread over vast areas,
the costs of organisation were considered too high. Conversely, as urban interests,
consisting of labour, business and bureaucrats, constitute small and closely knit
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groups, the incentives for organisation and hence the ability of urban associations
to influence government policy was high. l Bates further argued that the
development strategy of import substituting industrialisation created urban
coalitions of bureaucrats, business and labour which served to exploit agricultural
producers. According to the urban bi as perspective, African governments found it
harder to suppress the organised interest of labour in particular due to the potential
of urban labour to threaten governments in the cities. In a significant number of
African countries, the power of the state rested solelyon its ability to control the
cities. Fear of unrest by urban workers therefore compelled African governments
to keep food prices as low as possible (Bates 1981).
The theory of urban bias became very influential on the thinking of international
donors as well as development scholars in the 1980s. As economies throughout
Sub-Saharan Africa continued to decline, both researchers and donors began to
argue that in order to achieve sustainable economic reform, it was necessary to
alter the dominant coalition of workers, industrialists, consumers and government
in order to bring agricultural producers, and particularly export interests, to
centrality. The economic restructuring measures introduced by the international
financial institutions in the 1980s were, therefore, regarded as a remedy to the
urban bi as and the skewed development between urban industries and agriculture
in much of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1981). Following the logic of the
politics of structural adjustment reform and combining it with the recent emphasis
on popular participation in economic decision-making, it became evident that
African governments should focus their attention on their rural constituencies.
Regimes which have depended on small, but vocal constituencies in the cities
should ideally under a new liberal politicalorder seek to alter their social bases
and seek support from rural areas and peasants and farmer groups. Since the
economic reform proposals are designed to increase the incentives for agricultural
producers, according to theory, agricultural interests wil in turn provide the
governments with political support.
Theoretically, this scenario indeed looks very attractive. However, is it a feasible
scenario for Sub-Saharan Africa? Can the current strong emphasis on economic
liberalisation within a pluralistic political setting reverse the urban bi as which is
found to be so prevalent in African politics? Before turning to a discussion of the
case material on Zambian political realities it may be useful to review the general
theoreticalliterature on the role of interest groups in economic policy-making.
Interest groups and economic policy-making
Surprisingly and largely refuting the current perspective of donors assigning a vital
role to interest groups in the process of economic reform, studies conducted on the
For a further elaboration on the theory of collective action, see Mancur 01son, 1971.
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implementation of economic reforms seem to indicate that reforms have most
often been implemented without the impact and support of interest associations
(Nelson 1989 and 1993; Herbst 1993; Bates and Krueger 1993). Generally, the
literature has portrayed state - interest group relations in terms of lack of
involvement in economic policies on the part of interest groups. A widespread
perception seems to be that organised groups have opposed economic reforms
which are considered to weaken their vested interest in the old system. As aresult,
most studies seem to indicate that where economic reforms have been
implemented, governments have usually been ab1e to disassociate themselves from,
or been antagonistic to, groups with vested economic or political interests in the
old system. Alternatively, interest groups opposing economic reforms have been
discredited or are in disarray. Lastly, a common characteristic of countries
implementing economic reforms have been the existence of a diffuse but strong
public support for change (Nelson 1993: 436).
These observations seem to confirm the findings in a recent report on the
experience of structural adjustment reforms in eight countries in the South (Bates
and Krueger, 1993). This analysis concludes that interest groups may be unable
or unwiling to act in support of policies despite the fact that such economic
policies favour their interests. The eight country studies fail to attribute a decisive
role to the pressure of organised interest groups. Attempting to explain their
findings, the authors suggest that if those who stand to gain from reforms
constitute wide and dispersed groups where everyone benefits regardless of
lobbying, interest groups are unlikely to organise in support of reforms.
Furthermore, the authors conclude that since it may be difficult for a particular
group to calculate where its interest lies in the context of comprehensive policy
reform, a wide space is left open for rhetoric and persuasion (Bates and Krueger
1993: 457).
The negative conclusions regarding the role and impact of interest groups may
relate to the fact that the literature so far has focused predominantly on the
implementation phases of economic reforms (Nelson 1993). The longer term
aspect of consolidating reform, now reflected in the debate on ownership of the
reform measures, has so far not figured prominently in the comparative literature.
Nevertheless, the conclusions of the studies referred to here pose some critical
questions for the liberal democratic perspective and the potential for mobilising
societal support around structural adjustment reforms. Few studies indicate great
divergence between democratic and non-democratic regimes with respect to the
role of interest groups in processes of economic reform. Regardless of regime
type, the literature has largely portrayed the implementation of economic reform
in a rather autocratic fashion (Nelson 1993). Nelson finds that in the short run,
both elected and "irregular" new governments may have special opportunities to
adopt economic reforms as all transitional governments enjoy a "honeymoon", or
grace period, in which the economic problems can be justifiably blamed on its
predecessors. Furthermore, in turbulent political situations, interest groups likely
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to oppose the reforms may be in disarray or lack organisational resources (Nelson
1991: 51). However, in the long run, or in the consolidation phase, she argues that
democratically elected governments wil face the problem of containing popular
participation and demands and at the same time control wage pressure. In this
phase, the failure to reincorporate vital interests groups, such as labour, is likely
to set the stage for future conflcts (Nelson 1993: 439). In order to consolidate
economic reform under liberal democratic rule, Nelson concludes that it wil be
necessary to create institutions insulating key economic management functions
from political pressures while leaving other types of decisions open to legislation
and interest group participation. The need to strike such a balance is not on ly
necessitated by economic considerations:
The tension between demands for consultation and paricipation versus government' s
tendencies towards technocratIc decision making has obvious re1evance for the po1itica1
sustainability of economic reforms in the short run. Less obvious but equally important are
the imp1ications for longer run conso1idation of democracy. The ways in which initial
policies are made and early disputes are managed are shaping emerging interest groups'
ideas of what they can expect of their new governments and therefore of what strategies
and tactics they should adopt. The mind-sets and organizational arrangementsformed in this
period wil influence the character of politics for years or decades to come (Nelson 1993:
459, italics added).
The quotation above stresses a fundamental but so far understudied aspect of the
twin processes of economic and political reform, namely the ro le and nature of
political institutions. Questions concerning the establishment of institutional
mechanisms of cooperation between societal associations and the state; what forms
consultation and cooperation should take; which economic institutions to shield
from popular pressures; and how to bring interest groups into responsible
negotiations concerning national economic policies with state institutions have so
far only been treated superficially. Reflecting on the argument of Nelson, analyses
of the institutional options and prospects for sustainable reform should possibly
start by analysing state - interest group relations in the period prior to the
introduction of reforms. Now turning to a discussion of political and economic
developments in post-colonial Zambia, the particular challenges related to the
simultaneous process of political and economic liberalisation in Sub-Saharan
Africa wil be ilustrated.
State and interest group relations in Zambia. Assessing the
relevanee of urban bias
As argued above, in Africa authoritarian rule in general served to weaken or
suppress organised interest groups. The means for doing so ranged from outright
repression to the use of cooptation. This proclivity seems largely to have
characterised the policies of UNIP in the post - independence period as well. After
independence in 1963, the nationalist government sought through various means
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to undermine or incorporate vocal and organised interest associations. Employing
political methods which have be en described as "welfare authoritarianism" (Bates
1976), the nationalist government continually relied upon its ability to command
and allocate financial resources as a means of fulfillng popular demands and
securing political support. An example is provided by Beveridge and Oberschall
(1979). According to these two Zambian businessmen, lobbying by Zambian
business associations in the 1960s and 1970s in order to modify the government' s
economic policies did not succeed. From the time of independence, the UNIP
government assumed an ambivalent attitude to African business, and the
government did not wish to be seen to directly promote their interest. As aresult,
the government largely failed to develop institutions for meaningful national
bargaining. Instead, individual firms and businesses were often effective in
obtaining limited favours. According to Oberschall and Beveridge (1979: 268-
269):
For African businessmen the best strategy for achieving particular aims was to activate
personal re1ationships in individual cases...It was much easier to ask for and be granted an
exception than to modify policy proclaimed by President Kaunda.
Not disregarding the perspectives of Beveridge and Oberschall, Zambian politics
in the post independence period is widely regarded to have favoured the urban
sector at the expense of agriculture and rural interests. As a result, the theory of
urban bi as which according to the literature has been so prevalent in much of Sub-
Saharan Africa, has also been very central in analyses of Zambian post-colonial
political developments (Bates 1981; Burdette 1988; Callaghy 1990). The
prevalence of an urban bias in Zambian politics is also widely regarded as the
main reason why Zambia failed to implement the structural adjustment reform
measures advanced by the World Bank and IMF in 1985, as well organised, vocal
interests, seeing their vested interests in the present economic system threatened,
opposed the reform proposals (Ncube and Ndulu 1987; Loxley and Young 1990).
However, considering the first period after independence, the policies of UNIP
offer no c1ear evidence of an urban bias policy or practise, or preference for the
interest of the urban constituents.
In his thoughtfully argued study Rural Responses to Industrialisation (1976), Bates
addresses the rural development efforts of the post-independent Zambian
government. Analysing the political effects and responses to the government' s
ambitious Rural Development Programme, Bates clearly ilustrates that, contrary
to common presumptions later on, UNIP was initially very supportive of the rural
constituencies and responsive to the demands of the agricultural producers.
According to Bates, UNIP sought to buy support from the rural dwellers through
redistributional measures in order to prevent opposition. As a result, the largest
amount of money was spent where the resistance to the party, and thus potential
threat to its power hegemony, was strongest, as in the southern province where the
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African National Congress (ANCf had much support. However, says Bates, the
ambitious rural development programme failed largely because the lack of
competition from private markets reduced the producers incentives for effcient
production. According to Bates (1976: 159):
Through politica1 action in the nationa1ist period, the vilagers had he1ped to p1ace in power
a government that wou1d 1ay hold of the wealth of the cities and transfer it to the
countryside through programs of rural deve1opment. The new African government did
indeed try to upgrade the standard of living in the countryside... For a variety of comp1ex
reasons...the rural deve10pment program 1arge1y fai1ed to increase the 1eve1s of vil age
incomes significantly.
By 1971 the communal system of farming cooperatives had virtually seized to
function in many areas of Zambia and for the first time after independence Zambia
was forced to import maize from Rhodesia. Due to the economic decline which
became manifest in the early 1970s, the option of "buying votes" was made
increasingly more difficult. According to Bates, the economic dec1ine and
subsequent diminishing state resources is one of the main explanatory factors
behind the introduction of the one-party state in 1973 (Bates 1976: 246). In other
words, when it was no longer possible to attain political support through
redistribution, the nationalist government turned to repression. Thus, when
reviewing the agricultural policies in the post-colonial period, the failure appears
to be caused by faulty methods, rather than by an urban bias. As a result of the
failure to stimulate development in the rural districts, the government of UNIP
increasingly lost support in the rural areas and among agricultural producers.
Furthermore, agricultural producers became increasingly more marginalised from
the economic decision making at the national centre. Analyses of the economic
policies of UNIP throughout the 1970s and 1980s indicate that after the failure of
the ambitious rural development programme, the government more or less
abandoned the agricultural sector and concentrated its efforts on industri al
development. In other words, to the extent that an urban bi as developed in
Zambia, it is more a reflection of defeat in rural development rather than a
conscious choice of policy at the outset. Following the plummeting of agricultural
output in the 1970s, Zambia became increasingly more dependent on food imports.
Among the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa, Zambia suffered one of the greatest and
most rapid economic dec1ines from the beginning of the 1970s. From its status as
one of the wealthier African nations at the time of independence, Zambia is today
one of the poorest nations in Sub-Saharan Africa. After independence, the UNIP
government relied on its incomes from copper export to finance extensive and
2 African National Congress was the first major po1itica1 oppositiona1 movement in Northern
Rhodesia. In 1958 the movement split and a number of oppositiona1 forces, among them
Kenneth Kaunda, formed UNIP. ANC continued as a po1itica1 party unti1 oppositiona1 parties
were banned in Zambia in 1973.
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ambitious development programmes, both in agriculture and industry. As a res ult,
the collapse of copper prices which coincided with an enormous increase in oil
prices in 1973-74 seriously shattered the economy. According to one estimate, the
GDP declined by 30 per cent between 1975 and 1990 (Southern African
Economist, June 1990). The first stand-by agreement with the IMF was introduced
in 1976. Yet the austerity measures introduced between 1976 and 1983 failed to
address the underlying structural problems of the Zambian economy which were
related to a large and wasteful state sector, inefficient agricultural production and
an unsustainable policy of food subsidies. But as the economic crisis was
considered temporary, structural alterations were not perceived as necessary
(Callaghy 1990: 290). After 1976 the relationship between the !MF and Zambia
was characterised by steady increases in borrowing, matched by accelerating
stringent conditions. Essentially, these called for a major restructuring of the
economy by dismantling parastatals, reducing the public sector, increasing
agricultural production and decontrollng the currency. However, despite a lon g
series of IMF agreements, the economy continued to decline, and by 1983 the
government and the !MF agreed on a more comprehensive structural adjustment
package to be intensified in 1985 (Loxley and Young 1990).
The reform proposals of the World Bank and the IMF focusing on the abolition
or at least reduction of food subsidies to the urban population and on increasing
agricultural production by promoting small-scale farming and offering better prices
to farmers, seemed the obvious answers to Zambia's economic crisis. However,
it is also evident that the political costs of the proposed reform measures would
be exceedingly high in a society where 50 per cent of the population was located
in urban are as and where labour interests were protected by a strong and vocal
interest association. Due to a long tradition of subsidising urban consumer
commodities, the UNIP government was very vulnerable to urban protest. When
reductions of the maize subsidies caused 'food riots' and the death of 17 people
in 1987, President Kaunda abandoned the reform programmes (Rakner 1992).
The conventional interpretation of the failure to implement and sustain the
economic reform programme under one party rule, has been attributed to the
strong position of urban interest groups most notably labour (Ncube and Ndulu
1987). Undoubtedly, the Zambian labour movement campaigned ardently against
the reform proposals and applauded their collapse in 1987 (Rakner 1992). Bates
and Coller, however, reject the conventional explanations of the failure of the
economic reform programme and the role attributed to labour when analysing the
failure to implement structural adjustment reform in Zambia in 1985-1987 (Bates
and Coller 1993). Rather than relating the failure to the dominant position of
urban interest coalitions, They attribute the failed economic restructuring in
Zambia to the marginality or near absence of interest group influence on Zambian
economic policies. According to the authors, the political structure of the Zambian
one party state created a bias against producers, rural as well as urban. Based on
their study of the main economic interests in the country, labour, business and
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farmers, they find that producer interests, represented by business and farmers,
were marginalised in the political system and organised interests were largely
excluded from the structures of power. Systematically all the political forces which
could have benefitted from economic reforms, such as farmers, business interests
and employees in enterprises (labour) were outside the party's constituency. As a
result, these organised interests could not provide the government with support for
the economic experiment implemented in 1985. Bates and Coller conc1ude that
all interest groups which could have put a check on the government' s policies
leading to weak production incentives were outside the core constituency of the
governing party. As a result, the economic costs of the producers failed to translate
into political costs for politicians. Through the authoritarian practices of UNIP all
the main interest organisations in Zambia, organised labour, private business as
well as commercial farmers, had become enemies of the party and it therefore
lacked the institutional means to secure organised backing for policy reforms from
key interests (Bates and Coller 1993),
The political events taking place in Zambia in the late 1980s, adds credibility to
the conc1usions of Bates and Coller. As the Zambian economy continued to
deteriorate throughout the 1980s, the economic situation became the main
mobilising factor against the one-party regime. Former opponents of the economic
reforms both from the labour movement and protected industries now camp ai gned
against Kaunda and UNIP on a ticket of economic liberalisation (Rakner 1992).
The economic dec1ine which for so long had been considered temporary and
caused by external factors outside the control of the national government were
increasingly seen by a growing and vocal opposition as caused by the economic
policies of the government. When economic grievances were linked to the one-
party state and its economic policies, the oppositional forces, consisting of farming
and business interests as well as labour and intellectuals had firm ground from
which to campaign for political transition. In an election process which was
characterised as free and fair by international election monitors, the main
opposition party, Movement for Multparty Democracy (MMD), won a landslide
victory over Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP.
Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia
As argued initially , the current political situation in Zambia also poses one of the
greatest challenges to the theory of urban bias. A democratically elected, largely
urban based coalition is now implementing structural adjustment reforms.
According to conventional wisdom with regard to economic reform, trade unions
are among the strongest defenders of vested interests in the old system. Yet,
despite its former opposition to economic liberalisation, in 1989 the trade union
movement campaigned for MMD on a ticked of liberal economic reform and the
union movement played a key role in the process of transition to democracy. On
25 October 1991, the rainbow coalition of labour, business and commercial
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farming interests and UNIP dissidents formed the new government after a
landslide victory over Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP. It can be argued that the
victory was indeed too large, as with 125 out of 150 seats in Parliament MMD
became a de facto one-party government, a point which is further underscored by
the fact that UNIP secured its 25 seats solely from the Eastern Province. No other
opposition parties managed to win parliamentary seats. The new government
immediately embarked on its task of liberalising the economy while at the same
time ensuring that democratic principles were being observed.
Needless to say, the political developments in Zambia since 1991 have been
regarded with great enthusiasm by the international donor community. As the first
country in Africa to achieve political change through a peaceful and fair election
process, Zambia is implementing the "economic medicine" prescribed by the
international "money doctors". In international press reports and among Wodd
Bank officials the Zambian economic recovery programme is considered Africa' s
most ambitious programme to convert a state-run economy to a free-market one.
The positive reactions from the donor community made Zambia Africa' s largest
beneficiary of British and Japanese aid in 1992, and Zambia was the only country
in Sub-Saharan Africa that did not experience a cut in its support from the World
Bank for the fiscal year of 1993 (Africa Confidential, Vol 34, No 25, 1993).
Despite delays in various aspects of the implementation of economic reforms, most
notably in the area of privatisation of parastatal businesses, the Zambian structural
adjustment programme is considered to be in good progress. Considering the fact
that the current adjustment measures and the social effects are far more wide
reaching than the programme attempted to be implemented by the UNIP
government in 1985, this is in itself aremarkable achievement. The relative peace
is partly related to a greater understanding of the economic crisis on the part of
the Zambian leadership and population in general. Joan Nelsons concept of a
"honeymoon" period enjoyed by most new governments, whether democratic or
authoritarian, probably goes a long way to account for the relative success of the
economic reforms despite its serious social effects and open criticism from major
interest groups. MMD came to power on a mandate of promising change and
correcting the ils of the UNIP government. As the authoritarian regime of
Kenneth Kaunda and UNIP was largely perceived to have caused the Zambian
economic malaise, the UNIP government lacked the legitimacy needed to impose
the economic reform measures on the population. The "new brooms" of MMD on
the other hand stil appears to retain some legitimacy, albeit wearing thin, in terms
of genuinely trying to heal the economic malaise.
However, whereas the economic aspect of the twin reform process seems to be in
reasonably good pro gress, the political changes have proved more difficult and
conflctual. As argued above, the political aspects of the dual processes of political
and economic liberalisation wil always be challenging. The ways in which initial
policies are made and early disputes are managed wil impact on the longer run
aim of consolidating both democracy and the economic reform. Concerning the
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political reform measures, it can be argued that the new government so far has
indicated a weak commitment to democratic values. Signs of a deteriorating
political situation is very much related to the Presidential declaration of a state of
emergency on 8 March 1993. Likewise, the dismissal of four government
ministers in April 1993 has been followed with great suspicion from the press and
opposition. In a manner not unfamiliar to his predecessor, President Chiluba
refused to giv e any reasons for the dismissals of the ministers. (The Weekly Post
23-29 April 1993 and 11-18 August 1993; Africa Confidential Vol 34 No 25,
1993). The political conflct reached a peak as a number of the founders of MMD
launched a new opposition party named the National Party in September 1993.
Beyond doubt, NP represents a real political threat in opposition to MMD. The
MMD government was from the start a very broad based coalition inc1uding many
diverging interests. The recent split from the party and the establishment of a new
party may not be a great surprise or indeed a negative sign, given the initial
weakness of the parliamentary opposition to MMD. However, the political
methods applied raise some questions concerning the commtment to democratic
values on the part of the political actors. (The Weekly Post, October 8-14 1993,
Africa Confidential Vol 34, No 25, 1993). Throughout the campaign, MMD
focused on highly emotional ethnic issues rather than seeking to explain its
unpopular economic strategy, branding NP members as tribalists, attempting to
divide the nation and retard development.
So far, there is little indication of the economic adjustment programme in Zambia
being implemented within a liberal political setting. There are few signs of
consultation between the government and key associational interest or
parliamentary opposition. Judging from the press reports so far, the government
has not made an attempt to win support from its economic policies by
strengthening ties to any associational interests groups (The Weekly Post, 8-14
October 1993). The trade union movement, the former staunch critic of the
government under one-party rule, seems so far inhibited by the commitments made
at the time of election and the confidence it expressed in its former labour leaders
who are now in the MMD government (Africa Confidential 3-10 July 1992).
Despite having attained some positions in the new government and parliament, the
ZCTU appears to have little influence on the economic policies of the MMD
government. MMD' s commitment to trade union demand for cooperation on issues
such as redundancies and retrenchment packages seems limited. As a result of
lack of consultation and cooperation between the government and the labour
movement, the independent press has recently accused the leadership of the trade
union movement for having sold out to government demands (National Mirror 7
March 1993; The Weekly Post 3-9 September 1993). The industrial unrest is
increasing rapidly, and the trade union leadership appears to be powerless in terms
of disciplining its rank and file membership. In an effort to unite the labour
movement its president, Fackson Shamenda, has recently blamed the government
for acting irresponsibly and having broken its off communication with the labour
movement (The Weekly Post 3-9 September 1993).
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Summarising the experiences in Zambia, two years after the transition to
democracy, it seems evident that the liberal political reforms have only to a
lImited degree affected the implementation of the economic reform programme.
Contrary to the largely optimistic perspective advocated by the donor community
and a number of researchers, there are few signs indicating increasing cooperation
and consultations between associations of civil society and the state institutions.
The most critical aspect with regard to the twin processes of economic and
political liberalisation is that the MMD government seems to be following the
policy guidelines of the one-party government. Lack of consultations and
cooperations with key interest groups and suspicion and lack of respect for
opposition voices may form a pattern where interest groups return to old forms of
action.
As already stated, it is conceivable that economic reforms can be implemented
without the involvement or consent of any particular organised group of society,
despite the existence of channels to voice opposition. However, with regard to
recent developments in Zambia, the government' s "honeymoon" period in which
the economic problems can be blamed on its predecessor may not last long enough
for the reforms to have an impact. However, the authoritarian conduct of the
reform processes may have a lasting adverse impact on the political reform
process, which in the long run may impede the consolidation of the economic
reforms as well.
Concluding remarks
The main question of this paper has been whether economic liberalisation is
compatible with a simultaneous process of political liberalisation and thus the
opening up for interest group mobilisation and participation. Due to the ongoing
nature of the reform processes, the literature is stil inconclusive. However, this
paper has argued that the ability to sustain the economic reforms and the liberal
democratic institutions wil depend on the ability of new democratically elected
governments to strike a balance between the need for incorporating popular
participation and demands while at the same time securing a fiscal balance through
insulating some key economic institutions from public demands. How is such a
balance to be achieved? The literature on democratic transitions offers very littIe
guidance in this respect. The most realistic answer wil probably be that this wil
have to be analysed and conducted differently in the various national political and
economic contexts.
The comparative literature concerning the dual strategy of economic and political
liberalisation c1early underscores the need for establishing viable institutional
mechanisms for cooperation and consultation between the state and interest groups
in society. However, while focusing on state-interest group relations in post-
colonial Zambia, this paper has questioned the feasibility of building a strategy of
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political and economic liberalIsation on the assumption that organisationally
strong, autonomous interest groups seeing their interests protected and promoted
by the reform measures, wil form constituencies of support for the new
democratically elected governments. Throughout the post colonial period in
Zambia, the nationalist government of UNIP pursued politics aimed at weakening
or suppressing autonomous interest groups in order to promote national values and
development. As a result of a combination of cooptation and repression, the one-
party government exc1uded itself from all major interest associations of Zambian
society. The economic reform process in Zambia is faced with a formidable
challenge of trans forming agricultural production into an efficient economic
activity. Due to the low level of development and the legacy of two decades of
neglect of the rural sector, the paper has questioned whether rural dwellers are
prepared to provide the democratically elected government with political support
for a long time yet. The democratic transition in 1991 opened for interest group
participation and a free press, yet the constitutional changes do not necessarily
translate into real political cooperation and consultation. Reviewing state - interest
group relations in Zambia in a historical context it is evident that the main
challenge relates to the lack of political tradition for state -interest group
consultation. Simply put, the rural interest associations perceived by the donor
community to act as core constituents of the reform policies simply do not exist
in Zambia as in many other African nations.
Both the review of the literature and the discussion of current events in Zambia
have demonstrated that due to the weak position of interest groups in most
African countries, the impact of the current process of political liberalisation
should not be overestimated. There are few organisationally strong and
independent mass associations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the policy-
making process is stil dominated by a small privileged strata of urban elites and
the existing rural organisations are too weak and fragmented to threaten the urban
power monopoly in most spheres. It may therefore be more accurate to regard the
liberalisation process in Africa as a modification rather than a transformation of
the preexisting political conditions in which weak authoritarian regimes have be en
propelled into weak semi-democratic governments (Sandbrook 1993). With regard
to the economic reform processes, the simultaneous implementation of economic
and politicalliberalisation may therefore not constitute an immediate danger as it
may not be realistic to assume that political liberalisation wil result in
participatory explosions capable of disturbing the poorly institutionalised state
structures.
However, the long term political effects and the prospects of establishing strong
and autonomous civil societyassociations are more uncertain. With regard to
Zambia, the lack of political tradition for consultation and the inherent weaknesses
of civil society have so far resulted in a liberal democratic constitution having
produced few changes to the old order of conducting politics. The present
government has so far indicated litte interest in bringing major associational
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coalitions into consultation. It is conceivable, therefore, that interest associations
rather than aiming to alter economic policies may retreat to the habit of seeking
exemptions to fit their individual concerns. Such a scenario wil not only have
implications for the liberal democratic institutions, but it wil also retard the effects
of the short-term gains of economic reforms.
As already stated, it is far too early to pass a verdict on Zambia's experiment with
a simultaneous process of political and economic liberalisation after only two
years. However, this paper has called for a realistic assessment of the role and
relevance of interest groups in terms of sustaining both the economic and political
reform efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa today. In this reg ard more attention both
from the donor community and researchers should be devoted to the issues of
developing and strengthening civil societyassociations and thus the democratic
process in the reforming countries.
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